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CHINA'S FOREIGN AID IN 1978
By

JOHN FRANKLIN COPPER

I. Introduction

The year 1978 witnessed a number of important changes and
firsts in China's foreign aid program. Most important was the
cutting of aid to China's heretofore largest recipients: Vietnam
and Albania. In this connection it was reported in mid-year that
China's populace welcomed the end of aid to these two countries
and that China's foreign economic assistance was unpopular
domestically. 1 Late in the year a wall poster was seen in Peking
(Beijing) which read: "While people were begging in the streets in
some parts of China, the dictator of our country distributed
Chinese money to his fellow dictators in Vietnam and Albania." 2
It was reported officially in the fall that China was cutting its
foreign aid program drastically and that the present level of aid
giving was about one-tenth that of 1970. This same source also
stated that China needed the resources that previously went into
the foreign aid program and that the program had not brought
sufficient political dividends. 3 At almost the same time the Prime
Minister of Papua New Guinea, after approaching China for aid,
admitted his disappointment at being told that "China now has a
new policy with regard to aid." 4 Peking also allegedly answered a
request from Tanzania for another railroad project and an iron ore
extraction project by saying that China needed railroad building
equipment at home and that the two projects suggested were "too
expensive and not economically feasible." 5
China requested aid from the United Nations for the first time
in 1978, while negotiating a number of long-term loans from

1. David Bonavia, "China Closes Purse as Own House Needs Repair: Move to
End Aid to Vietnam and Albania Shows Growth of Self-Interest," The Times
(London), July 24, 1978, p. 5.
2. "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," China Quarterly, January
1978, p. 187, citing a French news agency report of December 6, 1978.
3. "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," China Quarterly, January
1979, p. 187, citing a Swedish radio broadcast based upon a report from Hong Kong
by Rolf Soederbert.
4. Asia Research Bulletin, December 31, 1979, p. 315.
5. "Intelligence," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 102, No. 41, October 13,
1978, p. 5.
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Western countries. 6 Although it appeared contradictory that
China would solicit aid while continuing to give foreign economic
assistance, there was no sign that Chinese leaders were troubled
by this, or that the foreign aid program was to end. Other firsts in
1978 were praise from the United States for China's foreign aid
program and an alleged promise by China to give assistance to
Pakistan to build nuclear reprocessing facilities. 7
The report that China's aid giving in 1978 was only one-tenth
of that of 1970 is less startling than it may appear since 1970 was
the peak year in China's foreign aid program. Official aid given in
1970 was one hundred times more than the previous year, though
actual aid given was certainly not that much greater. 8 Moreover,
in 1971 officially reported aid dropped to just over one-third of
what it had been in 1970. According to Chinese government
sources, aid worth $121 million was extended in 1978, a figure
close to the totals of the previous three years (see Table 1). If a $56
million loan to Mozambique that was renegotiated in 1978 is
added, the total comes to $177 million, or more than any of the
previous three years.
Since official figures are hardly representative of China's aid
giving efforts, it is necessary to look to other data to make more
accurate judgments. The elimination of aid to Vietnam and
Albania clearly resulted in a marked drop in total aid deliveries probably by 50 percent or more. On the other hand, China's aid to
other nations remained about the same or increased. Peking gave
aid to 53 nations during the year, four more than in 1977 and nine
more than in 1976 (Table 2). Five nations received aid for the first
time; seven if Red Cross aid is added (Tables 3 and 4). Two

6. See Asian Recorder, December 10-16, 1S78, p. 19227. According to this
source, China was seeking aid, not only through U.N. development programs, but
also from WHO and UNESCO. The amount China wanted was $100 million,
according to a U.N. official.
7. In mid-year President Carter praised China's aid program in the context of
criticizing Soviet arms aid in Africa. In fact, Carter's National Security Advisor
Zbigniew Brzezinski urged China to step up its aid in Mrica to serve as a
counterweight to Soviet aid. See Time, June 5, 1978, p. 10. Concerning China's
reported offer of aid to Pakistan for nuclear reprocessing facilities, see Asian
Recorder, October 8-14, 1978, p. 19101, citing an article in the newsletter
Nucletonics published in New York.
.
8. See John Franklin Copper, China's Foreign Aid: An Instrument of
Peking's Foreign Policy (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company (1976), pp.
125-26.
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nations that had not received aid from China for some time, North
Korea and Ghana, once again became recipients of China's
largess. Peking promised or negotiated more than forty new aid
projects that could be defined as large or medium sized, involving
more than twenty countries (Table 5). Nine major projects were
completed during the year, several of which will likely have a
significant effect on the recipient country's development plans, as
well as its relations with China (Table 6).
Owing to China's termination of its aid program to Vietnam
and Albania, communist countries received about the same
amount of aid as non-communist Asian countries or African
countries, in contrast to previous years when communist nations
received the largest portion of Chinese aid. Middle Eastern
nations fared much less well, while China extended aid to only
two nations in Latin America and one in non-communist Europe.
Kampuchea and Pakistan were China's two largest aid·
recipients during 1978. The former was almost completely
dependent upon China's economic assistance for its survival.
Pakistan received aid from a variety of other sources, making
China something less than a major donor. Tanzania, in the past a
major recipient of Chinese aid, was noticeably being weaned from
Chinese·economic help. In fact, China publically expressed some
disappointment that it could not break its connections with the
Tan-Zam Railroad, a railroad line running through Tanzania and
Zambia, and China's largest aid project anywhere. Chinese
technicians had to return to help keep the railroad operational
after it had experienced serious problems that led to some
questioning in both recipient countries about its value and
usefulness. This undoubtedly explains why China has given no
indication, contrary to many observers' expectations, that it
would undertake another large project like the Tan-Zam Railroad.
China provided military aid to fewer countries than in the
past (Table 7). In fact, officially announced military assistance
was extended only to Kampuchea and Zaire. Aid to guerrilla or
revolutionary movements was also off, with guerrillas operating
in Rhodesia, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Meo
tribes in Laos being the only recipients (Table 8). Most of China's
assistance to foreign countries went to fmance projects in
public sector, but few seemed designed to foster socialism per se.
Roadbuilding, medical aid, agricultural assistance, textile mills
and other small factories, and power stations were the most
popular kinds of aid. China also built a number of stadiums

the
'
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sports complexes and meeting halls. Little aid was given to help
communist parties or organizations, and almost no food aid was
given. The sparse information available on aid negotiations
during the year, together with recipients' comments and attitudes,
suggest that China still favors giving aid in the form of noninterest loans with long repayment periods. The grant aspect of
these loans, however, remains less than Western aid because they
are repayable in commodities rather than in currency which
declines in value due to inflation. Also, as in the past, Chinese
economic aid is given to purchase Chinese goods only.
Judging from China's foreign aid program in 1978, its motives
in aid giving remain predominantly political, though its goals
varied among different nations and regions. In the case of aid to
non-communist Asian nations, Chinese leaders considered the
balance of power on the Indian subcontinent to be important to
Chinese security directly, as well as indirectly by preventing an
increase in Soviet influence there. In Africa, China's aims in
giving aid related to winning support for its foreign policy
objectives and its international views expressed in the United
Nations. Aid to communist nations can be tied to Sino-Soviet
differences and to China's bid for ideological leadership of the
bloc. Aid to Middle Eastern and other nations must be connected
to more specific goals and to local circumstances.
China's foreign aid program in 1978, as has been true over the
past several years, was not in any sense competitive with Western
aid programs. On the other hand, China actively sought to
compete with Soviet aid giving, and in several cases either
terminated aid when its influence diminished and Soviet influence
increased, or increased aid to countries that were experiencing
problems with the Kremlin. Peking criticized the Kremlin for
using aid in exploiting recipient countries and causing them to
lose their political and economic independence. Specifically
mentioned was the fact that Soviet aid advisors and technicians
demand large salaries and much better living conditions than
those of local citizens, and that their technicians keep secret the
blueprints for aid projects. 9 The fact that Soviet loans carry
interest and sometimes cannot be repaid and that the repayment
is tied to the export of raw materials to the Soviet Union were also
cited.

9. See "Two Kinds of Aid," Peking Review, No. 33 August 18, 1978, p. 36.
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In terms of more general foreign policy goals, China's foreign
aid program seemed to reflect an effort to maintain some measure
of leadership of Third World countries and win support among
poor countries for China's foreign policy aims. It also mirrored a
perspective on the part of Chinese leaders that events in other
parts of the world affect China - though this attitude did not
seem to extend to Latin America to any meaningful extent. In the
context of a larger role in the United Nations and the possibility
of China's becoming an important recipient of U.N. aid, Peking
gave evidence of bringing its aid program into line with
international guidelines. In one case China gave aid under U.N.
auspices. If this can be regarded as a precedent, it represents a
major switch from China's policy of giving only bilateral aid.
Bloc and regional assessments of China's aid during 1978 are
made in the following sections. Specific aims and events in
China's aid giving during the year are analyzed, juxtaposed
beside general objectives and trends. After the bloc and region
assessments conclusions are made concerning the successes and
failures of China's aid program during 1978 together with some
expectations concerning China's future aid giving.

II. Aid to Communist Countries
China's aid to communist countries declined significantly in
1978 owing to the severing of aid to Vietnam and Albania. The
final decisions in both cases came in mid-year and may, in fact,
have been connected. Clearly both moves seem related to China's
own development plans and its need for more investment funds at
home. On the other hand, there is good evidence to suggest that
China's aid relations with Vietnam and Albania were based on
different motives and China had special reasons for breaking its
aid ties with each. Despite the official termination of its aid to
these two countries, China continued work on projects almost
completed and some projects were even finished in these two
countries during the year (in contrast to the Soviet Union's mode
of terminating its aid progran1s to China and Albania).
Kampuchea received· large amounts of Chinese aid, both
economic and military, and a sizeable contingent of Chinese
engineers, technicians and laborers were in the country up until
the time it was overrun by the Vietnamese army. No figures are
available on the value of Chinese aid to Kampuchea during the
year, but it is uncontestable that Kampuchea was the largest

6
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recipient of Chinese assistance among both communist and noncommunist countries during 1978. And, although the fall of the
Pol Pot re~me ended the officiarflow orrud and forced Chinese
personnel to flee, guerrillas operating in the country and units of
Pol Pot's army that reorganized in Thailand and returned to
Kampuchea continued to recieve assistance from China.
Laos continued to benefit from Chinese assistance in 1978,
and though China appeared to be very active in providing Laos
with aid during the year, this can probably best be described as a
holding action or an effort to counteract the growing influence of
Vietnam and the Soviet Union and their increased aid to Laos.
China's road-building efforts in upper Laos, which had been going
on for a number of years, continued to preserve a Chinese sphere
of influence there. The value of Chinese help to Laos in 1978 is
difficult to estimate, notwithstanding the fact that Chinese
leaders had much to say about it during the year.
China also extended essentially token amounts of aid to
Romania and North Korea during the year. In March it was
reported that Chinese workers and technicians were helping to
build a polycarbonate production unit in Romania. 10 In September
the government of North Korea announced the completion of a
large construction project with the help of Chinese technicians. 11
Kim 11 Sung sent gifts and medals to the Chinese technicians and
praised their work, suggesting that they were ~id personnel and
that the project was built in part or entirely with Chinese
assistance.
China provided economic aid to Vietnam during the first part
of the year, though in a very truncated form, as had been true
during the previous two to three years. Peking probably hoped to
keep Hanoi from falling completely into the Soviet orbit, even
though it was clear that Vietnam was siding with Moscow
regarding Sino-Soviet differences and was becoming heavily
reliant upon Soviet aid. Early in the year Vietnamese leaders had
given some cause for thinking that they would not unequivocably
side with the Russians by requesting Western aid and by pursuing
better relations with nations of the region that were openly cool to
the Kremlin's "Asian Security Plan" - which was viewed in
Peking as a device for "containing" China. In May, however, it
was reported that China had decided to withdraw its specialists
10. Agerpress, March 20, 1978, cited in China Aktuell (Hamburg), April 1978,
p. 9.

11. Korean Central News Agency, September 6 and 8, 1978. Cited in Ibid.,
October 1978, p. 15.
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working on 20 projects in Vietnam. The stated reason was that
China needed the funds to feed large numbers of refugees that
were being forced to leave Vietnam. 12 Subsequently the Chinese
Foreign Ministry announced that it was cancelling part of its
"complete factory aid projects" to Vietnam.1 3 Almost at the same
time, however, Peking reported that a large oil bunker had been
built and put into use in Vietnam, stressing that it was part of
China's aid program to VietnamY Peking apparently wanted to
give the impression that it was cancelling its aid to Vietnam
because of Hanoi's actions and sought to avoid the impression
that it was trying to disrupt Vietnam's economy or was acting
vindictively.
In July the Chinese government sent a note to Vietnamese
officials saying that China "had been compelled" to stop all
economic and technical aid and that it was recalling its engineers
and other technical personnel still working in Vietnam. 15 Peking's
explanation, subsequently published in Peking Review, stated
that the reason was that Vietnam had "obdurately stepped up its
anti-Chinese activities" and was guilty of "ostracism of Chinese
residents in Vietnam." 16 The article went on to say that Vietnam
had "seriously damaged the friendly relations between the two
countries," had created a "foul atmosphere of vilifying and
inciting antagonism against China," and had destroyed the
"minimum conditions required for the continued stay of Chinese
experts ... to carry on aid projects." 17
In July Hanoi reported that China had cut off aid for 21
projects in early May and had cancelled another 51 projects by the
end of June.l 8 Another source put the total number of projects
cancelled at 72, the entire value of which was $1 billion. 19
12. East German Domestic Service, May 23, 1979, cited in Foreign Broadcasting Information Service Daily Report, People's Republic of China, Vol. 1, No. 101,
May 24, 1978, p. AS (hereafter referred to as FBIS).
13. Vietnam News Agency, June 17, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, July 1978, p.
15.
14. New China News Agency, June 28, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1 No. 126,
June 29, 1978, p. Al3.
15. New China News Agency, July 3, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1 No. 129, July
5, 1978, p. All.
16. "China Compelled to Terminate Economic and Technical Aid to Vietnam,"
Peking Review, No. 28, July 14, 1978, p. 27.
17. Ibid.
iS. Hanoi Radio, July 5, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, August 1978, p. 16.
19. Nayan, Chanda, "Southeast Asia comes Into Focus," Far Eastern
&onomic Review, Vol. 101, No. 27, July 7, 1978, p. 8.
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Japanese reporters observed over 100 Chinese technicians leave
Hanoi on July 9, most of whom had been working on a bridge
construction project near the capital city. 20 Vietnamese officials
told Japanese reporters at the time that the suspension of Chinese
aid was "naturally causing certain immediate difficulties in
Vietnam." 21 The government of Vietnam also reported that in
July China had decided to end training programs for Vietnamese
pos~-~aduates studying in China. 22
The scope of Chinese aid to Vietnam, if Chinese sources are to.
be believed (and their reports were not contradicted by Hanoi),
was much more than most Western sources had previously
estimated: somewhere between $10 billion and $20 billion over a
20-year period. Teng Hsiao-p'ing (Deng Xiaoping), according to
one source, put the figure at $14 billion; a different source said he
valued it at $18 billion. 23 In this connection he was quoted as
saying that the only thing wrong with Chinese economic aid to
Vietnam was that "it was too much." He also asserted that the
sum total of Chinese aid to Vietnam was "much more than from
the Soviet Union."24
An article in People's Daily stated that most of the "over $10
billion" in aid to Vietnam was given in the form of grants and the
rest in interest-free loans. 25 It went on to say that China had
provided Vietnam, over the course of thirty years, with almost $6
billion worth of complete plants and non-military materials, 100
locomotives, thousands of railroad cars, 700 ships, and tens of
thousands of motor vehicles. The article also stated that many of
these items were supplied by factories in China that were
producing only for Vietnam, or were purchased abroad with
"precious" foreign exchange. It also declared that China provided
20. Vietnam News Agency, July 19, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, August 1978,
p. 16.

21. Kyodo News Service, July 9, 1978, cited in Ibid.
22. "Chronical and Documentation," The China Quarterly, December 1978, p.
65, citing a British Broadcasting Corporation summary of world broadcasts report.
23. The former figure was mentioned in an interview with Tomokazu
Sakamoto, chairman of the Japan Broadcasting Corporation. See China News
(Taipei), June 6, 1978, p. 4. The second figure comes from an interview Teng had
with visiting Thai journalists in Peking cited in Asian Recorder, p. 14427, July
23-29, 1978. Also see Robert D. McFadden, "Chinese Gave at Least $10 Billion,"
New York Times, July 4, 1978, p. 4.
24. Asian Recorder, July 23-29, 1978, p. 14427.
25. See Frank Ching. "China's Cutoff of Aid to Old Allies Creates Doubt
Among its Friends," Asian Wall Street Journal, July 27, 1978. The Author cites a
People's Daily article of the previous week.
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Vietnam with better weapons than it had at home and that many
Chinese had "shed their blood and laid down their lives" in
Vietnam.
There were probably several important reasons behind
China's decision to sever its aid to Vietnam, besides the fact that
China needed more capital to finance its own modernization
plans. First, China considered it a hostile act for Vietnam to
mistreat and expel Chinese residents, and found it costly to
absorb them into China, where most of them had never lived. In
June, when Teng Hsiao-p'ing announced that Chinese aid to
Vietnam would be reduced, he accused Hanoi of mistreating
Chinese living in Vietnam and stated that Vietnam had "expelled
110,000 Chinese still pretending that they had simply escaped out
of the country." A second reason for cutting its aid was opposition
to Hanoi's policy of creating a "Federation of Indochina." Chinese
leaders had long advised Hanoi not to reunify Vietnam too
quickly, and not to try to make Laos and Cambodia puppet states.
China preferred the three Indochinese nations to remain independent and wanted to pursue relations with them separately.
Vietnamese leaders had not followed this advice and instead had
stationed large numbers of troops in Laos and had infiltrated its
government. Their policy of establishing a federation also brought
them into direct military conflict with Kampuchea, which China
supported and aided. Third, Chinese leaders were upset over
Hanoi's ties with the Soviet Union and Vietnam's reliance on
Soviet aid. Peking had expected Vietnam to solicit Western aid
and not become overly dependent upon the Soviet Union for
economic assistance. Chinese leaders therefore opposed Vietnam's
industrialization plans which required increased amounts of
Soviet aid. Chinese leaders were especially antagonized by
Hanoi's allowing the Soviet navy to use Vietnamese ports, and
rumors that Vietnam would give the Soviet Union exclusive and
by unlimited use of Cam Ranh Bay in exchange for Soviet
military assistance. China likewise opposed Soviet-Vietnamese
cooperation in Laos and Hanoi's support of Soviet and Cuban
activities in Mrica.
As in the case of Vietnam, China announced work on aid
projects in Albania both before and after the termination of aid to
the Albanian government. In May Peking announced that a
plastics factory had been built and put into operation in Albania,
boasting that it was the largest of its kind in the country and was
capable of producing 270 different kinds of plastic products and

10
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items for use in industry and agriculture. 26 In late July, after the
cutoff of aid, Peking publically announced the completion of a
factory for building prefabricated parts for houses, noting that it
also was the largest in the nation and that it produced the parts
for 14,000 square meters of five-storied flats. 27
In early July, confirming rumors about strains in SinoAlbanian relations and an end to China's foreign aid, Peking
announced formally that it was terminating its aid to Albania
and recalling its aid personnel there. The announcement, first
made public through China's official news ·agency and later
published in Peking Review for international distribution, stated
that China had given Albania military and economic aid totaling
more than $5 billion since 1954. 28 Peking provided details in a
note to the Albanian Embassy, also published in Peking Review,
stating that China had signed agreements on 142 projects, 91 of
which were said to have been finished, 23 nearly completed and
17 surveyed or designed. According to the note, China had also
sent 6,000 aid personnel and experts to Albania, trained 2,000
economic and military cadres in China, delivered 1.8 million tons
of grain, and p'rovided aid in the following areas: iron and steel,
chemical fertilizers, caustic soda, acids, glass, copper processing,
paper; plastics, armaments, electricity, coal, petroleum, machine
tools, textiles, building materials, communications and broadcasting.29
The note also asserted that China had provided food aid to
Albania when there were scarcities in China, that electric power
stations were supplied even though electricity was in short supply
at home, and that modern Chinese tanks and fighter planes were
sent to Albania before China's own armed forces were equipped
with these weapons. 30 The note further disclosed that Albania had
been granted a $250 million interest-free loan in 1975, in addition
to a free grant of military· aid, and in 1977 China deferred
payments on loans for approximately $110 million repayable
26. New China News Agency, May 29, 1978, cited in. China Aktuell, May 1978,
p. 11.

27. New China News Agency, July 21, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1 No. 142, July
24, 1978, p. A17.
28. New China News Agency, July 13, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1 No. 136, July
14, 1978, pp. A12-A16; and "Chinese Foreign Ministry's Note on China's Forced
Cessation of Aid to Albania," Peking Review, No. 29, July 21, 1978, pp. 2Q-23.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
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during the period 1980 to 2000. 01 Mention was also made of the
fact that all Chinese aid had taken the form of free aid or noninterest-bearing loans. Peking obviously wanted to present an
image of generosity.
In explaining the reasons for stopping its aid to Albania, the
note to the Albanian Embassy documented several cases where
the Albanians had sabatoged aid projects or had through
inattention or carelessness allowed accidents to occur. Also cited
were demands by the Albanian government for more aid and for
help to repair projects damaged or not maintained by the
Albanian side. Finally the note reported Albania's attacks on
China's domestic and foreign policies, anti-Chinese activities, and
slander against the late Chairman Mao. More specifically it
asserted that Albania had maligned China's aid program after
having given great praise to Chinese assistance in the past, and
had criticized China's leadership, ideology and foreign policy. 32
Albania responded by criticizing Chinese aid, specifically
citing delays in aid deliveries of as long as six years. 00 The
Albanian government also chided Chinese efforts to control the
Albanian economy and dictate its economic development plans.
Albania also mentioned China's slowness in breaking with the
Soviet Union in the 1960s, and the excesses in China during the
Cultural Revolution. The important issue from Albania's perspective, however, seems to have been China's rapprochement with
the United States after the death of Mao in 1976 and its
subsequent improved relations with Yugoslavia. Albanian leaders
may, in fact, have perceived that China was abandoning Albania
in favor of better relations with Yugoslavia and the West.
Certainly after improving relations with the United States,
the Chinese viewed Albania as less valuable as an ally and for its
strategic location; thus differences between the two countries were
no doubt partly a product of China's changing priorities. 34
Chinese leaders were also obviously displeased with Albania's
criticism of Mao's "Three Worlds Theory," which rationalized
China's relations with the capitalist West and which became
official ideology after Mao's death. It may not be coincidence that
31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.
33. Zeri i Popullit (Alabania), July 30, 1978, cited in Keesing's Contemporary
Archives, August 10, 1973, p. 2926.
34. See "Stop the World, We Want to Get Off," Asia Week, September 1, 1978,
p. 14 for further details on this point.
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Peking made the announcement of the termination of its aid on
the first anniversary of Albania's attacks on this policy. Also,
when Albania referred to China's "imperialist tactics" in its feud
with Vietnam, Chinese leaders were no doubt angry. In fact, this
may have been an important factor motivating Peking to dump its
two most important aid recipients at virtually the same time.
The Albanian government tried to disguise the importance of
the loss of Chinese aid by giving publicity to several economic
accomplishments. Soon after the severance of Chinese aid,
Albanian officials announced the installation of turbines in an
electric power generating plant, new departments in a metallurgical complex, the production of the first Albanian-made tractor,
and the completion of Ballash oil refinery. 35 Notwithstanding, it
was clear that the termi~ation of Chinese aid would be a blow to
the economy, which was already experiencing serious problems.
With China accounting for about 70 percent of Albania's trade
and supporting a large portion of the nation's economic development program through its aid, the loss of this economic help had
to be felt.
Unlike Vjetnam and Albania, Kampuchea.received increasing
amounts of aid from China during the year. Much of China's aid
to Kampuchea, however, was military aid and in no case was the
exact kind or amount of aid specified. Thus it is impossible to do
more than estimate the value of Chinese aid during the year. In
fact, it may be more meaningful to say simply that it was
considerable rather than try to put a dollar figure on it. On the
other hand, Chinese assistance was not sufficient to prevent the
successful invasion of Kampuchea by Vietnamese forces at the
end of the year, which caused the fall of the Pol Pot regime.
During the year, China made no official promises of new aid
or credits to Kampuchea, though this was unnecessary in view of
the $1 billion aid promise made in 1975, much of which had
probably not been used. The flow of aid could be confirmed by
project work financed by China, by the delivery of goods, and by
the imbalance in their trade accounts. The only official mention of
aid by China came indirectly when Pol Pot gave a party for
Chinese technicians in Kampuchea in July. 36 Kampuchean
sources gave some details on Chinese assistance mentioning that
35. Zeri i Popullit (Albania), October 13-15 and November 28, cited in
Kessing's Contemporary Archives, December 10, 1978, p. 3140.
36. New China News Agency, July 7, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 132, July
10, 1978, p. A20.
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Chinese technicians were working on restoring a cement factory,
a phosphate factory, a textile mill, a plywood factory, a power
station, a glassware factory and a tire factory.37
The amount of aid and its importance is even better reflected
in the diplomatic activities between the two countries, China's
feud with Vietnam, and Kampuchea's needs. At the beginning of
the year, China was clearly titling toward Kampuchea in its
struggle against Vietnam. 38 In January Chou En-lai's (Zhou
Enlai) widow visited Kampuchea and met with Pol Pot. Mter her
return to China it was reported that China regarded Kampuchea
as a "victim of Vietnamese aggression." 39 It was also reported at
this time that Chinese soldiers were fighting in Kampuchea,
though this could not be confirmed. 40 Hanoi at this time
proclaimed that China was giving vast amounts of military aid to
Kampuchea - enough to "help them build up and equip overnight
a dozen divisions armed with long-range artillery and warplanes.
"41

In June and again in July, the Kampuchean Minister of
Foreign Mfairs, Ieng Sary, visited Peking. The second visit
coincided with a trip by Defense Minister Son Sen, who met with
Deputy Premier Chen Hsi-lien (Chen Xilien). Chen stated at the
time that the Chinese army would "always support the Cambodian army." 42 It was subsequently reported that Chinese leaders
had agreed to supply Son Sen with large quantities of small arms
and weapons that could be hidden in the countryside for use by
guerrillas in the event of an invasion by Vietnam. 43 There was
also speculation, however, that China was reluctant to continue

37. Phnom Penh Radio, July 7, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, August 1978, p.
15.
38. See the two sides' statements reported by the New China News Agency on
December 31, 1977 and January 1, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 1, January 3,
1978, pp. A10-A11. The Vietnamese statement was truncated and summarized.
39. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, October 27, 1978, p. 29295.
40. See Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1979 Yearbook (Hong Kong: Far
Eastern Economic Review, Ltd., 1979), p. 325. No sources are cited. For an
opposing view see David Binder, "Vietnam Holds Cambodian Region after Bitter
Fight, U.S. Aides Say," New York Times, January 4, 1978. This source cites "U.S.
officials."
41. Hanoi Radio, February 21, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 49, February 22,
1978, p. A10.
42. Kessing's Contemporary Archives, October 27, 1978, p. 29295.
43. Nayan Chanda, "Cambodia's Cry for Help," Far Eastern Economic
Review, Vol. 101, No. 32, August 11, 1978, p. 13.
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support of the Pol Pot regime in view of its human rights record,
China's efforts to improve relations with the United States, and
the expectation by Chinese leaders that Vietnamese forces would
Soon invade Kampuchea with the help of anti-Pol Pot forces in the
country and overthrow the Pol Pot government. Chinese leaders
may also have perceived that, owing to logistical problems, there
was little they could do to help stop an invasion by Vietnam.
On the other hand, Western sources reported, prior to the
Vietnamese invasion, seeing tanks, armoured vehicles and large
artillery in use in Kampuchea for the first time, apparently
shipped in from China via the port of Kompong Som. 44 There were
also reports that in July China had agreed to provide Kampuchea
with large . quantities of air and naval weapons and was
expediting its training of Kampuchean pilots in China. 45 In
addition, in November Chinese instructors were seen in Battambang in western Kampuchea training Khmer pilots to fly MIG19s.46 According to U.S. intelligence reports, Chinese were also
helping build an airfield near Phnom Penh capable of handling
both jet fighters and bombers. 47 It was estimated at this time that
China had 20,000 advisors and technicians in Kampuchea. 48
Prior to and while anticipating Vietnam's invasion, Chinese
Politburo member Wang Tung-hsing (Wang Dungxing) and
veteran economic planner Yu Chiu-li (Yu Quili) visited Kampuchea while Teng Hsiao-p'ing visited Bangkok. Teng reportedly
querried the Thai government about using Thai airspace for
flights from China to Kampuchea, ostensibly to guarantee the
flow of military equipment and supplies to that country in view of
the treaty Vietnam signed with the Soviet Union on November 3
and the expected Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea as the dry
season approached. 49 Alternatively, Teng may have had in mind
the evacuation of Chinese personnel. It was also reported at this
time that China twice rejected requests from the Pol Pot
government for combat troops. 50
44. Facts on File, June 30, 1978, p. 490.
45. Asian Recorder, September 10-16, 1978, p. 18910.
46. Nayan Chanda, "A Dry Season Infiltration," Far Eastern Economic
Review, Vol. 102, No. 44, November 3, 1978, p. 15.
47. CBS Evening News, seen in Memphis, Tennessee at 5:30p.m., November 9,
1978.
48. "Intelligence," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 102, No. 46, November
17, 1978, p. 5.
49. Ibid.
50. "Vietnam Lashes Out," Newsweek, December 13, 1978, p. 47.
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In any event, the invasion of Kampuchea cut China's aid
supply routes to Kampuchea, except what could he delivered via
land routes through Burma and Thailand with the help of proChinese communist insurgency groups. During early 1979 it was
still uncertain how important this might be or if there were large
caches of Chinese weapons in the countryside. Anyway, even if
there were stores of Chinese weapons in the country, it was
unknown whether this would be able to help sustain a guerrilla
campaign against the Vietnamese army in Kampuchea.
In Laos, China's aid efforts were less definite in terms of both
China's commitment and its successes. Peking made a number of
offers and official promises of aid during the year, and it finished
a major road project that had been under construction for 16
years. Soviet economic aid to the Laotian government overshadowed Chinese aid, however, and the Vietnamese presence in the
country was larger than China's. In addition, there were clear
signs that Laos was tilting toward Moscow and Hanoi because of
the need for Soviet aid (foreign aid has comprised 70 percent of the
national budget in recent years) and the presence of at least 30,000
Vietnamese soldiers in Laos. Yet China maintained a presence in
the north, where it had been involved in road construction for
more than a decade. Peking appeared to be waiting for the Soviets
and the Vietnamese to alienate the people of Laos more than they
already had, or for the government's problems with the Meo tribes
and other insurgents to escalate.
In January, according to sources in Laos, China offered to
build additional roads throughout the country and construct some
unspecified light industries in Vientaine; but the Laotian
government rejected the offers and instead asked China to build
an earlier-promised brick factory in the northern part of the
country and one new project in the capital. 5 1 According to Chinese
sources its negotiators signed two protocols for aid projects with
the government of Lafls in January, one of them for complete sets
of equipment, the other not specified. 52
In March th~ construction of- the Laos-China Friendship
Weaving Factory was started in Oudomsay Province in northern
Laos. 5 3 And in April a turning-over ceremony was held for the Na
51. Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1969 Yearbook, p. 28.
52. New China News Agency, January 21, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 15,
January 23, 1978, p. A6.
53. New China News Agency, March 14, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, April
1978, p. 9.
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Sang-Bou Hai Highway in upper Laos. 54 Construction on this 286kilometer asphalt highway, part of a Chinese-built network of
roads in northern Laos, started in October 1973 and was
completed in February 1978. These road projects have long
provided China with an excuse for having worker-soldiers
numbering up to 20,000 in Laos. 55 During the American bombing
they were protected with artillery and other weapons, which
remained after the communist takeover in 1975. The holding of
the ceremony may have constituted a veiled effort by the Laotian
government, under pressure from Moscow and Hanoi, to get some
or most of the Chinese worker-soldiers out of Laos. In any event,
10,000 left, though they were reportedly replaced by 5,000 others to
do some finishing work on the road network. 56
In mid-year China's foreign aid program in Laos remained
active, or so it seemed based on official Chinese accounts. In May
it was reported that 20 percent of the Laos-China Friendship
Textile Factory had been completed. 57 In July Peking announced
the beginning of work on the brick factory mentioned above. 58 In
mid-September, however, a high Chinese official told the mayor of
Paris that Laos is "henceforth completely dominated by Vietnam."59 In the context of previous and subsequent aid activity it
appears that this remark was directed at the Laotian governJpent
and may have been intended to pressure it to limit Soviet and
Vietnamese efforts to extend their influence into the northern part
of Laos. Altematively it may have been a warning to the Laotian
government that the war in Kampuchea might spread to Laos if it
did not maintain its neutral stance. The Laotian government's
acceptance of Chinese Red Cross assistance at almost the same
time the remark was made and its announcement just days after
that an oxygen factory was being started with Chinese assistance,
tends to support this conclusion and may indicate that Peking did
not regard Vietnamese domination as a fact. 60 Further evidence is
54. New China News Agency, April 8, 1978, cited in ibid., May 1978, p. 11~
55. See Copper, China's Foreign Aid pp. 58-60 for further details.
56. Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1969 Yearbook, p. 228.
57. Vientiane Radio, May 14, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, May 1978, p. 12.
58. New China News Agency, July 15, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, August
1978, p. 15.
59. AFP, September 18, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, October 1978, p. 15.
60. For details on the Red Cross aid see New China News Agency, September
19, 1978, cited in FBIS Vol. 1, No. 183, September 20, 1978, p. A13, and Nayan
Chanda, "A New Ration of Problems," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 101,
No. 41 October 20, 1978; for details on the oxygen factory, see KPL, September 28,
1978, cited in China Aktuell, October 1978, p. 15.
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the organization by the Laotian government at this time of a
photographic exhibition on Chinese development, and the sending
of a delegation to Peking to celebrate China's national holiday. 61
In any case Chinese aid to Laos was not terminated as would
have been expected if Chinese leaders had perceived that Laos
had fallen into the Soviet-Vietnamese orbit.
There were also unconfirmed reports during the year to the
effect that China was aiding the Meo tribes with weapons and
supplies and hoped to detach part of northern Laos from the rest
of the country. 62 Rumors emerged in this context that China was
cutting its aid to Laos, but these were debunked by aid discussions
and deliveries in September. 63 Other reports indicated that China
had broached the subject of building a railroad in Laos, but that
the offer was turned down. 64 This may have been less than a
genuine offer, however, since building a railroad, like extending
the Chinese-built roads in Laos further south, would give the
Soviets and Vietnamese greater access to northern Laos where
China's influence predominates and the difficult terrain favors
China.
In view of the fact that Laos asked for and received economic
aid from the United States during 1978, not to mention receiving
aid from the United Nations and from a number of donors both
communist and capitalist, a waning of Chinese influence is not
necessarily indicated by the large quantities of Soviet aid
compared to Chinese aid and the presence ofVietnamese soldiers.
Laos seems to have tilted toward the Soviet-Vietnamese camp, but
it has also maintained some degree of independence. China's
continued willingness to give aid and the willingness of Laos to
accept it, plus China's physical propinquity, seem to suggest that
China will continue to maintain some presence and influence in
Laos.

III. Aid to Non-Communist Asian Countries
China's aid to non-communist Asian countries in 1978
followed previous patterns and there were no new recipients (with
the exception of Thailand, which received a small Red Cross
61. See Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1969 Yearbook, p. 228.
62. Nayan Chanda, "A New Threat from the Mountain Tribes," Far Eastern
Economic Review, Vol. 101, No. 35, September 1, 1978, p. 8.
63. See MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff, "Laos 1978: The Ebb and
Flow of Adversity," Asian Survey, Vol. XIX, No. 2, February 1978, p. 100.
64. Nayan Chanda, "Laos Caught in the Crossfire," Far Eastern Economic
Review, Vol. 101, No. 24 June 16, 1978, p. 11.
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donation). Afghanistan, a past recipient, was not mentioned by
Peking in connection with its foreign aid giving in 1978, probably
reflecting the rise of Soviet influence there. For the first time
China probably gave more assistance in dollar terms to noncommunist Asian countries than to any other region or bloc. This
was the product of both the cutting of aid to Vietnam and Albania
and the increasing strategic importance of South Asia in the eyes
of Chinese leaders. Soviet encroachments in the area and
continuing efforts by the Kremlin to contain China, underscored
by the pro-Soviet coup in Afghanistan, were particularily
challenging to Chinese leaders. The goal of preventing India's
domination of the subcontinent and an effort to maintain a
balance of power of sorts in the region also remained important.
The fact that China's aid went almost exclusively to countries in
South Asia rather than Southeast Asia might be seen to reflect a
shift in geographical focus of interest, though this is probably
more the result of cautious attitudes on the part of leaders of the
nations of non-communist Southeast Asian nations toward China,
rather than a shift of strategic concern by Chinese leaders. Only
in the case of Burma was meaningful aid .given to a communist
party or organization, though some assistance may have been
given to the Communist Party of Nepal. In no case can it be said
that Chinese aid was given specifically for the purpose of
advancing socialism or assisting the socialist sector of the
recipients' economy. China's concern with increasing its foreign
trade, however, did appear to be a motive in giving aid, especially
to Nepal and Pakistan and to a lesser extent Sri Lanka and
Bangladesh.
Aid to Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal clearly increased
during 1978. Aid to Sri Lanka and Burma remained at about the
same level as in recent years. Pakistan was the largest noncommunist recipient of Chinese aid during the year, and
Bangladesh the recipient of the largest aid promise during the
year of those whose value was officially announced. Mtcr
Kampuchea, Nepal was probably the nation most influenced by
Chinese aid in terms of both its economic and political impact.
Peking made several announcements of new aid in progress to
Burma in 1978. However, no mention was made of the value of
any of the projects promised. And, in spite of what seemed to be
significant aid discussions and meaningful promises, Burma was
not an important recipient of Chinese aid during the year; nor did
China provide much of the external. assistance the Burmese
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government obtained. The greater than usual publicity given to
aid by China may reflect problems in its relations with the
Burmese Communist Party which China had long supported both
psychologically and with weapons and supplies. Alternatively,
China's more open discussions of aid to Rangoon may simply
have represented an attempt to prevent Burma from tilting toward
Vietnam and the Soviet Union- a factor that had become more
important because of the struggle for influence in Indochina.
In March Peking announced the completion of the Meiktila
Textile Mill in Burma, reportedly equipped with 80,000 spindles
and 600 looms. 65 That same month Chinese leaders signed an
agreement to expand this mill with a "second-stage project." 66
One interpretation of this aid promise by China was that it was
an effort to maintain good relations with Burma in the wake of
the visit therjby Teng Hsiao-p'ing in late ANUARY. It may also
have related to China's efforts to support the Pol Pot government
in Kampuchea, since it is likely that Teng broached the subject of
transit rights through Burma to send supplies to Kampuchea or
for overflight privileges. Another possibility is that Teng wanted
to pressure the Burmese communists to support China's efforts in
Kampuchea and Laos or to actively resist Vietnamese "expansion·
ism." China at this time was also providing supplies and probably
weapons to the Burmese Communist Party. 67 In any event, after
Teng's visit the Burmese Communist Party mounted a new
offensive against government forces in northern Burma and
increased terrorists activities throughout the country. Apparently
the Burmese Communist Party did not approve of China's aid to
Rangoon and wanted to demonstrate its displeasure.
In May a technical team from China arrived in Burma to
make a feasibility study on the construction of a 10,000-seat
indoor stadium in Rangoon. 68 However, a summary of talks on
this project was not signed until October. Meanwhile, Chinese aid
to Burma was given a more official place when Peking Review
publicized the textile mill it was expanding, noting that it was the

65. New China News Agency, March 9, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, April
1978, p. 10.
66. Ibid.
67. Klaus Fleishmann, "Burma," in Richard F. Staar (ed.), 1979 Yearbook on
International Communist Affairs (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), p. 226.
68. Rangoon Radio, May 8, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, June 1978, p. 12. Also
see Rangoon Radio, October 20, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, November 1978, p. 10.
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largest in the country. 69 China seemed to be making offers and
giving publicity to its aid to Burma to test the Burmese
government's response.
China's foreign aid program in Nepal was active during 1978,
and, as in previous years, continued to help prevent Nepal from
tilting politically toward India or the Soviet Union or becoming
economically dependent on either of these countries. China's
foreign aid also facilitated trade and helped redirect some of
Nepal's foreign commerce through China. A somewhat more
active aid program than usual in 1978 (Since the 1950s China has
regarded relations with Nepal as important to China and has
maintained an active foreign aid program there) probably represented efforts by Chinese leaders to enlist additional support for
their foreign policy views that were coming into direct conflict
with Moscow and Hanoi. Alternatively aid was used to compensate for not opening up Tibet to trade with Nepal as China had
earlier promised. China sent some financial aid to a faction of the
Communist Party of Nepal, but this probably had no effect on
official relations between the two countries. 70
In February Teng Hsiao-p'ing visited Katmandu, and though
he failed to mention a major highway project that China had
already discussed with Nepalese officials and postponed discussions on a large water project, he promised three industrial
projects and agreed that Chinese teams would soon visit Nepal to
study other projects. 71 Teng probably wanted to extract some
promises from the Nepal government, or at least test their
reactions to tenets of Chinese foreign policy in several realms,
before extending additional aid.
In March a textile mill built with Chinese aid funds went into
operation in Nepal and 200 tons of cotton lintel were air-shipped
from Pakistan. The mill could not operate at full capaCity,
however, due to the lack of electricity. 72 In June an industrial
survey team from China arrived to conduct feasibility surveys of
ceramic, paper pulp and sugar factories. 73 And, in September
69. "Meiktila People's Textile Mill," Peking Review, No. 31, August 4, 1978, p.
30.

70. Barbara Reid, "Nepal," in Richard F. Staar (ed.), 1979 Yearbook on
International Communist Affairs, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), p.
274.
71. The Asian Student, February 25, 1978, p. 4.
72. Asian Recorder, March 12-18, 1978, p. 12411.
73. Katmandu Radio, June 14, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, June 1978, p. 15.
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Peking signed an agreement with the government of Nepal on the
construction of "complete projects." 74 The Chinese side failed to
mention the costs or conditions involved in the agreement;
however, it was reported by other sources as valued at $40 million
and designated for the building of a sugar refinery and a paper
mill. 75 In December the Chinese media reported the completion of
the Hetanda Cotton Textile Printing and Dyeing Mill, which at
that time was handed over to the Nepal government. It was said
to be the largest of its kind in the country and capable of turning
out 10 million meters of cloth per year. 76
China's aid to Nepal during the year may be viewed as
successful in maintaining friendly ties between the two countries
and even in improving relations. Nepal supported the ChinaJapan treaty, although this should perhaps be attributed as much
to the generous aid given and promised by Japan. Nepal's
continued close relations with India probably did not bother
Chinese leaders too much, while cooling relations with the Soviet
Union, in spite of an agreement signed during the year by Moscow
to build a turpentine factory in Nepal, no doubt pleased Peking.
China's aid to Pakistan was extensive and though it exceeded
aid given to any other non-communist Asian country, it did not
make up a large portion of Pakistan's total economic help. Nor did
it facilitate economic development in any significant way. On the
other hand, China's assistance was useful and helped maintain
friendly ties between the two countries, and it helped parry Soviet
overtures and threats. Roadbuilding was very important and two
other forms of aid offered great possibilities: a steel mill and
nuclear reprocessing facilities. Like China's aid activities in
Burma and Nepal, new difficulties with the Soviet Union and
Vietnam, combined with the savings resulting from cutting aid to
Vietnam and Albania, influenced decisions resulting in more aid
to Pakistan.
In January Islamabad announced.that China had agreed to
supply Pakistan with a timber seasoning plant, but furnished no
further details on this aid donation. 77 At almost the same time the
74. New China News Agency, October 1, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 193,
October 2, 1978, p. A10.
75. Lok Raj Baral, "Nepal 1979: Year of Hopes and Confusions," Asian
Survey, Vol. XIX, No. 2, February 1979, p. 201.
76. New China News Agency, December 30, 1979, cited in China Aktuell,
January 1979, p. 12.
77. Karachi Radio, January 15, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, January 1978, p.
9.
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Pakistan government announced that China was providing
engineering training to Pakistanis. 78 In March government
officials in Islamabad revealed that iron ore deposits had been
discovered in Baluchistan through exploration work aided by
China and that a feasibility study was being conducted by China
for a "mini" steel mill there. 79 It was also made known at this time
that China was providing aid, technical training, and machinery
for a glass factory.~
China's most important aid project in Pakistan, the 500-mile
Karakoram Highway, was completed in May and inaugurated in
June. This highway was started 15 years ago by Chinese and
Pakistani army engineer corps. The Chinese segment was
completed in 1970, after which Peking made available its
engineers and equipment to Pakistan. The first phase of
construction on the highway in Pakistan was finished in 1971; the
second was started in 1974 and completed in May 1978. 81 Work on
the road had been kept as secret as possible, but became widely
known during 1977 when local tribes tried to block construction
through sabatoge and the taking hostage of Chinese and
Pakistani workers and engineers. An undisclosed number were
killed and the Pakistani government had to dispatch troops to the
area so that work could continue. 82 President Ziar revealed at the
time of the road's completion that more than 400 Chinese and
Pakistanis had lost their lives building the road (though many
died from causes unrelated to the violent activities of the local
tribes) and that at times 20,000 Chinese workers had been helping
on the project. 83 According to Chinese reports, stone and earth
work totaled 16.9 million cubic meters, and 85 bridges were built
with a combined length of 3,631 meters. 84 Part of the reason for
the extensive earth moving was the occurrence of an earthquake
in the region in 1974 and a number of avalanches.
The road is an all-weather one and connects Pakistan's
capital with roads and railroads in China. More than this, it
provides the final link in a continuous road system from China's

78. Karachi Radio, January 17, 1978, cited in Ibid.
79. Karachi Radio, March 7, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, March 1978, p. 9.
80. Karachi Radio, March 3, 1978, cited in Ibid.
81. See "Karakoram Highway," Peking Review, No. 27, July 7, 1978, p. 42.
82. See Copper, "China's Foreign Aid in 1977," Current Scene, Vol. XVI, Nos.
8 and 9, p. 27, for further details.
83. Asian Recorder, July 30-August 5, 1978, p. 14990.
84. "Karakoram Highway," Peking Review, No. 27, July 7, 1978, p. 42.
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Pacific coast to the Atlantic shore of Europe. The road will also
open isolated parts of Pakistan, some of which are known to be
abundant in minerals and precious stones, including diamonds,
gold and mica. And it will facilitate the development of
hydroelectric resources in northern Pakistan. Finally, it is
strategically important to Pakistan, particularly in view of the
coup in Mghanistan during the year.
In July the Pakistan government announced that a-fertilizer
plant was being built at Haripur with Chinese assistance at a cost
of $37 million. 85 However, no details were provided on the amount
of financial aid provided by China for the project or the
conditions. In August it was confirmed that China would help in
building a small steel mill in Baluchistan. 86 In November a sugar
mill built with Chinese aid and capable of producing 400,000 tons
of sugar a year, went into operation. 87 Again, however, no details
on the costs of these projects or the conditions of aid were
mentioned.
In the fall it was reported that China had offered Pakistan the
technology to process spent nuclear fuel and extract pure
plutonium. 88 According t~ this source the promise was made after
France's cancellation of an agreement to supply Pakistan with a
reprocessing plant. The report was made more credible by the fact
that President Ziar had assured the public that he would get the
reprocessing facilities one way or the other. However, the absence
of followup reports or any mention of the offer by the Chinese
government suggests that no such offer was made or that it was
only a tentative proposal.
No mention was made during the year of Chinese military
assistance to Pakistan, but given the importance and amounts of
Chinese military aid in the past, it is likely that some may have
been delivered. A Soviet source reported that Pakistan was
sending Chinese military equipment to Somalia, but this was
officially denied by the Pakistan Foreign Ministry. 89
China's aid to Pakistan during 1978 had considerable
influence, in combination, of course, with other instruments of its
85. Karachi Radio, July 12, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, August 1978, p. 15.
86. Karachi Radio, August 5, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, September 1978, p.
13.
87. Karachi Radio, November 6, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, December 1978,
p. 13.
88. See footnote 6.
89. New China News Agency, February 6, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 31, No.1,
February 7, 1978, p. A9.
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foreign policy. Pakistan made a move to leave the Central Treaty
Organization during the year, but was pursuaded by China not to.
The coup in Afghanistan and that country's tilting toward
Moscow had an impact in Pakistan, but this was no doubt
lessened because of ties with China and Peking's economic aid
to Pakistan. Pakistan resisted direct Soviet overtures and
Indian pressures probably in large part because of its ties with
China which were augmented by aid. Chinese aid also had special
importance in the context of the cessation of U.S. aid to Pakistan
because of the patterns efforts to gain nuclear status.
China was active in supplying aid to Sri Lanka during 1978,
but this took the form mostly of completing projects started in
previous years. Another rice-for-rubber deal was concluded on the
25th anniversary of the first such agreement, and as usual its
terms were favorable to Sri Lanka. No figures were given on any
new aid or projects in progress, probably because they were not
impressive compared to Western aid projects and Sri Lanka
wanted to praise China's generosity thinking this would attract
more Western aid. In addition, Peking probably did not want the
monetary value of its aid compared to that given by Western
nations.
In May Peking reported the completion of a cotton spinning
mill started in Sri Lanka in 1976. 90 This mill reportedly can
produce 1.6 million kilograms of yarn a year, and is the largest of
its kind in the country. In August a fish-breeding experimental
station built with Chinese aid and technical help was turned over
to the Sri Lanka government. 91 The station breeds the Chinese
grass carp which is now raised in rivers, lakes and reservoirs in
Sri Lanka.
China's aid to Sri Lanka continued to help balance India's
influence, and it was apparently deemed useful for China to
maintain ties with one of the important leaders of the non-aligned
nations. The fact of a rightist government in Sri Lanka seemed to
make little difference to Chinese leaders, who had been reluctant
to aid the former socialist regime because of its unproductive
economic policies and inefficient use of aid. Granting new aid,
however, may have been pointedly avoided in order not to evoke

90. New China News Agency, May 19, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, May 1978,
p. 12.

· 91. New China News Agency, August 14, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 158,
August 15, 1978, p. A20.
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the suggestion that China favored the new regime over the
previous socialist one.
China's aid program to Bangladesh followed the pattern of
the two previous years. Some of the aid promised in 1977 was
formalized by being publically announced, naming specific
projects and the value of Chinese commitment to each. Apparently Chinese leaders perceived that aid to Bangladesh would be
seen by both the world and the Chinese people as needed and
generous. Peking successfully cultivated good relations with the
Bangladesh government, especially when compared to relations
between that government and the Soviet Union. This probably
explains why China granted aid, why it refrained from assisting
any communist movement in the country, and why it was willing
to announce the value of its aid even though a number ofWestern
countries were more active and more generous in giving aid to
Bangladesh. Nothing was heard about the continuing of military
aid, however, which was expected after a promise in 1977 to
provide Bangladesh with MIG-21 aircraft and other weapons.
In March China signed an agreement with the government of
Bangladesh to provide an interest-free loan for $60 million to build
a fertilizer plant. 92 According to a Bangladesh source, this plant
will produce 180 tons of urea per day when finished. 93 Also
included in the agreement was a water conservancy project that
will provide irrigation facilities for 4,500 acres of land. In April
China announced that it would train officials and technicians for
work in fish hatcheries in Bangladesh, making use of an
experimental fishery grounds developed in Canton by the U.N.
Development Program and the Food and Agricultural Organization. 94 This is one of the few times China has cooperated with the
United Nations in the aid realm and set a precedent for
conducting such a cooperative project in China.
China's aid efforts both paralleled and augmented a successful effort to increase trade with Bangladesh. Two top-ranking
Chinese leaders visited Dacca during the year, apparently to
discuss trade ties. China ostensibly wanted to increase its
commercial ties with Bangladesh to offset India's influence in the
area and compensate for the decline of Bangladesh-Soviet trade.
92. "Intelligence," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 101, No. 13, March 31,
1978, p. 5.
93. Dacca Radio, March 21, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, March 1978, p. 9.
94. New China News Agency, April 3, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, April1978,
p. 11.
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Peking may have had still another motive in mind: Bangladesh
can serve to help China improve its relations with Middle Eastern
countries where China also seeks to counter Moscow's growing
influence.
During the year China also donated $30,000 in cash through
the Chinese Red Cross to help flood victims in Thailand. 95 This
was the first time China had extended aid in any form to
Thailand and represents much-improved relations between the
two countries in recent years. This donation might also be seen as
specifically related to China's concern with events in Kampuchea,
particularly the need to fly through Thai airspace or emPloy
communist groups in Thailand to help support the wareffort in
Kampuchea.
IV. Aid to African Countries
China officially granted aid or continued aid projects in
progress to thirty-one African countries, two more than in 1977.
Five to ten nations can be categorized as important recipients of
Chinese aid. Tanzania has been and remains China's most
important aid recipient in Africa, though Chinese economic
support to that country continued to show a decline and in 1978
there were clear indications that this trend would not be reversed.
Zamia, Somalia and Zaire would also classify as major recipients.
Peking's recent aid agreements with Chad, Cameroon and
Botswana may make these countries significant recipients in the
future, though relative only to aid projects in those countries, not
as a part of China's total foreign aid program because of the small
size of these countries. Four African nations, Botswana, Sychelles,
Surinam and Liberia, received aid from China for the first time in
1978. Ghana, a nation that had been an important recipient of
Chinese aid in the past, but with whom the aid connection had
been severed, received aid again in 1978.
Most of China's aid to African countries took the form of
small project aid. Moreover, China's aid program in Africa during
1978 suggested that this emphasis may be lasting: Peking had
cause for disappointment in large aid projects because of problems
with the Tan-Zam Railroad during the year. On the other hand,
Peking continued work on several major road projects and
committed itself to more road building in 1978. Medical aid and
95. New China News Agency, October 14, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 20,
October 16, 1978, p. AlO.

CHINA's FoREIGN

Am

IN

1978

27

agricultural projects constituted an important part of China's aid
giving in Africa during the year, continuing a trend of the past
decade. China provided very little military aid to nations of the
region during the year, Zaire being the only country that received
weapons officially. Peking sent arms to guerrillas operating in
and against Rhodesia, but its aid to rebel groups, like its support
for "wars of national liberation" in general, continued to decline.
Little support was provided to local communist parties or groups.
China's motives for aid giving in Africa seemed intimately
related to its foreign policy objectives in the area, the most
important of which was to counter-act Soviet influence. Chinese
decision makers seemed more motivated than usual by efforts to
build support for China's positions in the United Nations and its
leadership of Third World nations, probably again reflecting
Peking's conflict with the Soviet Union. Political motives clearly
took precedence over facilitating economic development or
building trade ties, even though both of the latter were as
apparent or more apparent than in Chinese aid giving elsewhere.
China continued to maintain a good reputation for purveying
projects that could be finished quickly and would show an
immediate result. As in previous years China continued to find its
policy of making its aid personnel live at local standards of living,
its low-cost labor, and grass roots projects good publicity for its
foreign aid program.
China demonstrated during 1978 an even greater willingness
than in past years to aid countries that also received economic
assistance, even in large amounts, from Western nations, and
where Chinese aid had little hope of much impact. In fact, judging
from China's aid efforts in Africa in 1978, China now has little
concern with "Western imperialism." Nor was there any shunting
of U.N. aid work. Peking seemed to be joining the international
community to a greater degree, or at least sought to use the
international community and tum it against the Soviet Union.
One of China's specific motives in this context was to-influence
the non-aligned nations of Africa to keep the Kremlin from
gaining leadership of this movement and thereby winning control
over the Third World generally. This no doubt prompted Chinese
efforts in Africa to assume an anti-Cuban bent in view of
Havana's support for Moscow's leadership of the non-aligned
nations and a pending meeting of that group in Cuba.
Tanzania and Zambia, two of the most important recipients of
Chinese aid in previous years, continued to receive significant
Chinese assistance during 1978. Of greatest importance was the
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return of Chinese railroad workers and advisors to keep the TanZam Railroad working. 96 Until recently this line was land-locked
Zambia's major transport link for the export of its copper. In 1978,
however, various problems arose and the question of the line's
profitability, and, therefore, its usefulness, became more serious.
In mid-year it was reported in Zambia that 19 or 27 locomotives
were under repair and that half of the train cars were not in
operation. Moreover, for various other reasons, including three
major accidents, the tum-around trip from Zambia to the port of
Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania, originally projected to take 15 days,
was requiring five weeks. 97 It was also reported that Tanzanian
and Zambian workers assigned to the line were disgruntled and
that thefts of thousands of dollars worth of goods had occurred. 98
The result of all these problems was the tie-up of 30,000 tons of
copper in Zambia, causing serious economic problems for a
country dependent on exports of this mineral for ninety percent of
its foreign exchange.
The crisis forced Zambia's President Kaunda to announce the
opening of the long-closed railroad line from Zambia through
Rhodesia. Also contributing to his decision were the lack of
fertilizer for the nation's maize crop, the International Monetary·
Fund's demand that Zambia solve its transport problem and
internal political opposition which supported using the rail line
through Rhodesia. 99
In response,' and no doubt fearing the credibility of its largest
aid project and thus its foreign aid program in general, China
agreed to extend the stay of 750 railroad experts who were to leave
Tanzania and Zambia in 1978 and leave 60 instructors as well. 100
Later Chinese drivers and guards were also sent back to run the
trains after the arrest of twenty Zambian crew members for
stealing.l01 By the end of 1978, however, it was uncertain what
96. For further details see Copper, China's Foreign Aid, supra note 8, pp.
103-08.
97. John Borrell, "Chinese Back on Zambia Railways," The Guardian
(London), July 6, 1978, p. 8.
98. Ibid.; Alan Cowell, "Trouble on the Mainline: Political Events Disrupt
Zambia's Rail Link," Christian Science Monitor, May 10, 1978, p. 14.
99. Radio Accra, October 4, 1978, cited in Africa Research Bulletin, September
15-0ctober 14, 1978, p. 4795.
100. Daily News, (Tanzania), August 1, 1978, cited in Africa Research Bulletin,
July 15-August 14, 1978, p. 4773.
101. John Borrell, "Chinese Back on Zambia Railways," The Guardian
(London), July 6, 1978, p. 3.
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effect this was going to have on the efficiency of the line or the
decision by the Zambian government to seek alternative transportation routes.
Other aid announced to Tanzania during the year included
medical teams and doctors and a promise to help the coal mining
industry. In January a medical team completed work in Z&nzibar,
and in September a group of 44 Chinese doctors left the country
and were replaced by a new group. 102 In the fall a protocal was
signed by the two countries on economic and technical cooperation, but aid was not mentioned specifically. 103 In October it was
reported that China had turned down requests by the Tanzanian
government for another rail line and an iron ore extraction
project, but instead promised a coal mining project. 104 While
China's foreign aid program continued to be active in Tanzania,
with projects promised in recent years being implemented
(including iron ore mining, steel production and the ChinaTanzania Joint Shipping Company), 1978 witnessed no new aid
promises or undertakings of any significance. 105 Thus, China did
not keep pace with other donors that were providing Tanzania
with economic assistance, and a nation that was once very
dependent upon Chinese foreign aid is no longer.
Peking did not seem alarmed at this prospect and may, in
fact, be satisfied with Tanzania's growing reliance upon Western
aid. China has kept Soviet influence out of this part of Mrica and
this may be all that Chinese leaders want. In this connection it is
interesting to note that Chinese aid to Tanzania, especially to its
steel industry, indicates a diminishing concern by China with
fostering socialism and instead with greater attention to economic
feasibility. Tanzania's steel industry uses incentive methods to
enhance worker productivity, apparently with Peking's blessing
and even encouragement. 106 This suggests, together with other
evidence, that China is receptive to further cooperation with
Western aid donors and may indicate that Chinese leaders

102. New China News Agency, September 23, 1978, cited in China Aktuell,
September 1978, p. 15.
103. New China News Agency, September 14, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No.
180, September 15, 1978, p. A15.
104. "Intelligence," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 102, No. 41, October 13,
1978, p. 5.
105. For further details see African Research Bulletin, April15-May 14, 1978, p.
4520.
106. Ibid.
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perceive that capitalist development may be a way to guard
against Soviet influence, China's overriding concern at the present time.
In Zambia specific projects receiving attention during the
year were the construction of a "palace of the people" and medical
aid. The former project was given coverage in the press in China
in February and the latter was mentioned at the end of the year. 107
Aid to Zambia, like China's economic assistance to Tanzania,
seems to be designed to insure that the Soviet Union will not gain
a foothold in the area. Western aid to Zambia has also increased
and again China seemed unconcerned. More specifically, Chinese
aid to Zambia during 1978 seemed aimed at preserving some
influence with the Zambia government particularly at precluding
decisions that would have a bad effect on the Tan-Zam Railroad.
On the other hand, the rail line is not as important to Peking now
that China has found large reserves of copper at home, while
better relations between Zambia and Rhodesia may be seen by
China to limit Soviet opportunities in the area. In short, Chinese
leaders now have reason to question the basic assumptions which
motivated undertaking and finishing China's largest aid project.
China's foreign aid to Somalia was extensive in 1978.
However, despite offers of military aid in 1977, Somalia's needs,
and speculation about Chinese arms aid to Somalia in 1978, there
was no confirmation of any deliveries of Chinese weapons. Peking
in effect denied giving military aid to Somalia by publishing the
Pakistan government's refutation of a Soviet report that Chinese
weapons had been shipped to Somalia by Pakistan. 108 If indeed no
arms were sent, the probable reason for China's restraint was that
Somalia preferred to get weapons from Middle Eastern countries
and the United States, and was successful in so doing. Peking
may also have anticipated that its arms deliveries would be more
than offset by Soviet military aid to Ethiopia and that it was to its
advantage in terms of reducing Soviet influence in the area to let
the Arabs and the Americans get involved.
In April China reported sending medical personnel to replace
those working in Somalia. 109 During the same month it was
107. New China News Agency, February 23, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 41,
February 24, 1978, p. A9; China News Agency, December 23, 1978, cited in FBIS,
Vol. 1, No. 269, December 24, 1978, p. A12.
108. New China News Agency, February 6, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 26,
February 7, 1978, p. A7.
109. New China News Agency, April 30, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, May 1978,
p. 11.
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publicized that a bridge started in December 1977 was finished. 110
China also agreed to take over several irrigation projects started,
but not finished, by the Soviet Union. 111 Finally, in September
local sources reported on Chinese assistance to rice growing. 11 2
The biggest Chinese aid project in Somalia, however, was a
970-kilometer all-weather road finished in July after three years of
work. In August Vice-Premier Chen Mu-hua (Chen Muhua), an
alternate member of the politburo and the person in charge of
China's foreign aid program, attended the opening ceremony. The
road now serves as a link between northern and southern
Somalia, making possible the shipping of agricultural products
from the south to the pastoral areas of the north.m Since the road
is close to the border with Ethiopia throughout most of the area it
transverses, and since it connects with a road that leads to the
capital city of Mogadishu, it obviously has military uses, and the
speed of construction seems to reflect that fact. According to
Peking, the project was originally turned down by Western
countries because of the cost of transporting water to construction
sites, a problem which the Chinese easily solved by building wells,
water storage areas and canals - which were given to the
Somalia government when the project was finished. 114 Another
benefit for Somalia was the reported training by the Chinese of
2,500 native workers in various skills during the course of the
project. 1 L"> Though Peking did not cite the value of the project,
Western sources put the final cost of the project at $64 million,
noting that it was financed by a soft-term loan. 116
Zaire was the most important recipient of Chinese military
assistance in Africa during 1978 and probably second only to
Kampuchea elsewhere. This assistance took the form of a
continuation of military aid given previously to repel the invasion
of Angolan forces, plus new supplies of arms. Peking wanted to
110. New China Naws Agency, April 23, 1978, cited in ibid.
111. New China News Agency, April 21, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 79,
April 22, 1978, p. A9.
112. "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," China Quarterly, January
1979, citing a British Broadcasting Corporation report.
113. "Desert Highway in Somalia," Peking Review, No. 37, September 15, 1978,
p. 29.
114. Ibid.
115. New China News Agency, August 1, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 146,
August 2, 1978, p. A14.
116. James MacManus, "Graveyard for White Elephants," The Guardian
(London), March 6, 1978, p. 14.
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offset Soviet influence in the region and Zaire was seen to still
occupy a · central, strategic location. In June, when Chinese
Foreign Minister Huang Hua visited Zaire, it was reported that
China was helping train Zaire's naval forces and that a military
delegation from Zaire would visit China soon to discuss additional
military assistance. 117 During that visit Huang promised President Mobutu "full support" for Zaire's just struggle to safeguard
its national independence against "a new aggression by ...
Soviet socialist imperialism." 118 Subsequently it was reported that
Zaire had requested that China provide two patrol boats and 20
tanks.ll 9 According to a Western source, China in mid-year was in
the process of making deliveries, but was not sending any troops
or advisors as had been previously rumored. 120
China also provided other assistance to Zaire during the year.
In January Chinese sources mentioned aid for the construction of
rice fields. 121 Subsequently Zaire's president visited a construction
site where Chinese aid was in use. 122 Several other aid projects
started in previous 'years were continued, and Zaire remained one
of China's most important aid recipients in Africa.
China made a number of other publically-announced aid
promises to Mrican countries during 1978. The most important
one was an agreement to build a bridge over the Chari River
between Cameroon and Chad and a $16.6 million interest-free
loan repayable over 20 years to Botswana for unspecified
development projects. 123 The former agreement with Cameroon
and Chad also mentioned the possibility of building a new road on
both sides of the border leading to the bridge. If this deal is
finalized the project will become considerably larger and more
expensive. Late in the year China promised Madagascar a 223kilometer road project, apparently an extension or addition to a
117. "Chinese and Mobutu Confer in Shaba City," New York Times, June 5,
1978, p. 3; "China Said to Send Instructors to Train Zaire Navy," New York Times,
June 19, 1978, p. 7.
118. Facts on File, June 9, 1978, p. 441.
119. Facts on File, August 25, 1978, p. 652.
120. Brussels Domestic Service, July 14, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 139,
July 15, 1978, p. A10.
121. New China News Agency, January 7, 1978, cited in China Aktuell,
January 1978, p. 5.
122. New China News Agency, February 23, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 49,
February 24, 1978, p. A13.
123. Africa Research Bulletin, March 15-April14, 1978, p. 4410; Africa Research
Bulletin, November 15-December 14, 1978, p. 4810.
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road started there by China in 1976. 124 China also promised to
build a dam in Burundi. 125
Less important aid promises made by Peking to African
countries during the year include a state farm to Botswana, 126
medical aid to Chad, 127 a rice mill in Kenya, 128 and a sugar
industry in Sierra Leone that would reportedly employ 2,000
people. 1 ~~ Protocol agreements were signed on rice and vegetable
farms and a sugar project for Liberia, 130 and on medical aid, a
sugar project and a station for disseminating information on rice
growing for Togo. 131 Minutes were signed on agreements for a well
drilling project in Senegall 32 and four health centers in GambiaY~ 3
Unspecified aid was promised to Rwanda, after which the
Rwanda government mentioned a rice-growing project, a cement
works, a hospital, a sports stadium and a flour mill. 134 In two
cases Peking attached a monetary value to new, small aid projects
in Africa: $3 million for building secondary schools in Seychelles135 and the renegotiation of a $56 million loan made to
Mozambique in 1975 (the amount which had not been used,
however, was not specified). 136
Actual aid deliveries recorded during the year to less
important African recipients include the following: Medicl:}l teams
124. Radio Nairobi, January 31, 1978, cited in Africa Research Bulletin, April
15-May 14, 1978, p. 4165.
125. New China News Agency, February 15, 1978, cited in China Aktuell,
March 1978, p. 9.
126. New China News Agency, April 16, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, May 11,
1978, p. 11.
127. New China News Agency, April 20, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, May 1978,
p. 11.
128. New China News Agency, December 28, 1978, cited in China Aktuell,
January 1979, p. 12.
129. Africa Trade Report, July 15-August 14, 1978, p. 410.
130. New China News Agency, March 9, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, April
1978, p. 9.
131. New China News Agency, April 2, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, May 1978,
p. 11; China News Agency, June 9, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, July 1978, p. 15.
132. New China News Agency, April 8, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, May 1978,
p. 11.
133. New China News Agency, March 26, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, April
1978, p. 9.
134. Africa Research Bulletin, December 15, 1978-January 14, 1979, p. 4861.
135. New China News Agency, December 28, 1978, cited in China Aktuell,
January 1979, p. 12.
136. The Standard (Kenya), November 3, 1978, cited in Africa Research
Bulletin, November 15-December 14, 1978, p. 4810.
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arrived in Chad late in the year; 137 agriculture technicians were
reported dispatched from China to Mozambique; 138 Surinam
received rice hulling machines as a gift during the year; 139 an
agriculture team was sent to the Congo; 140 and a medical team
was sent to the Central African Empire. 141
Aid in progress was reported in a number of African countries
not already cited. These were as follows: construction under way
on a state-owned palace in Cameroon; 142 a sugar mill and a
plantation being built in Liberia; 143 work in progress on a 7,000seat gymnasium in Ethiopia; 144 a hydroelectric station under
construction in Equatorial Guinea; 145 work in progress on an
irrigation works in Niger; 146 an ice plant being built in Uganda; 147
a rice research station under construction in Mauritania; 148 well
drilling underway in Nigeria; 149 Chinese technicians helping to
improve bamboo workshops in Madagascar. 150 In addition,
Chinese medical teams were reported on duty in Cameroon,
Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, and Malagasy. 151
137. New China News Agency, December 14, 1978, cited in China Aktuell,
January 1979, p. 12.
138. The Standard (Kenya), November 3, 1978, cited in African Research
Bulletin, November 15-December 14, 1978, p. 4810.
139. New China News Agency, October 4, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 221,
October 5, 1978, p. A9.
140. Peking Radio; February 6, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, March 1978, p. 9.
141. New China News Agency, September 10, 1978, cited in China Aktuell,
October 1978, p. 15.
142. New China News Agency, June 23, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, July 1978,
p. 15.
143. New China News Agency, November 29, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No.
230, November 30, 1978, p. All; Africa Research Bulletin, March 15-April14, 1978,
p. 4490.
144. New China News Agency, February 22, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 36,
February 23, 1978, p. A17.
145. New China News Agency, May 25, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, June 1978,
p. 12.
146. Ghanian Times, April 26, 1978, cited in African Research Bulletin, May 15June 14, 1978, p. 4519.
147. New China News Agency, April29, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, May 1978,
p. 11.
148. New China News Agency, May 19, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, June 1978,
p. 12; New China News Agency, November 28, 1978, cited in China Aktuell,
December 1978, p. 13.
149. New China News Agency, May 8, 1978, cited in ibid.
150. New China News Agency, June 26, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, July 1978,
p. 15.
151. New China News Agency, March 31, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 69,
April1, 1978, p. A12; New China News Agency, ~pril 5, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1
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Chinese aid projects reported completed during the year in
Africa in addition to those already mentioned were a power
station with seven kilometers of distribution line turned over to
the Ethiopian government; 152 a bridge finished in Sierra Leone
that will contribute to that nations part of the Trans-West Mrican
Highway, 153 plus a stadium; 154 a hydroelectric station put into
operation in the Congo; 155 a spinning mill finished and equipped
with Chinese-made machines in Ghana; 156 two rice growing
stations completed in Togo; 157 and a reclamation area for rice
growing finished in Upper Volta. 15 M
Besides the aid promises and work in progress cited above,
China gave some emergency and Red Cross aid to Mrican
nations. Early in the year China provided Senegal with 1,000 tons
of powdered milk to help drought victims there. 159 In April the
Chinese Red Cross donated $60,000 to help drought victims in
MauritaniaY30 And in September the Chinese Red Cross gave a
monetary donation of an unspecified amount to the government of
Burundi to help people in cholera-affected areas. 16 1
Some of these promises, donations, deliveries and completions
of projects deserve special comment. It is significant that China
continued to purvey aid to Ethiopia in view of that country's war
No. 75, April 6, 1978, p. A7: New China News Agency, September 2, 1978, cited in
FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 198, September 3, 1978, p. A14; New China News Agency,
December 15, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, January 1979, p. 12.
152. New China News Agency, August 26, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 149,
August 27, 1978, p. A14.
153. New China News Agency, February 22, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 36,
February 26, 1978, p. A17.
154. New China News Agency, December 15, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No.
246, December 21, 1978, p. A32.
155. New China News Agency, March 28, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, April
1978, p. 9.
156. New China News Agency, December 15, 1978, cited in China Aktuell,
January 1979, p. 12.
157. New China News Agency, March 14, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, April
1978, p. 12; New China News Agency, April 6, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, May
1978, p. 11.
158. New China News Agency, January 11, 1978, cited in China Aktuell,
February 1978, p. 9.
159. Afrique Nouvelle, January 17, 1978, cited in Africa Research Bulletin,
January 15-February 14, 1978, p. 4390.
160. New China News Agency, April 10, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 71,
April 12, 1978, p. All.
161. New China News Agency, September 26, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No.
215, September 27, 1978, p. All.
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with Somalia and China's adamant support for the latter. Chinese
decision makers apparently perceived that a continued presence in
Ethiopia may have some value or that the situation there was so
fluid that Soviet influence in that country may not be permanent.
It is also interesting that Peking was willing to deliver aid and
have active Chinese aid personnel in Uganda in view of that
country's conflict with Tanzania. Again Chinese policy makers
may have felt that their presence in Uganda was worth
continuing the aid relationship with that country.

V. Aid to Other Countries
Nine Middle Eastern countries received Chinese aid in 1978,
two more than in 1977. Lebanon was the only new recipient, with
aid to that country taking the form of emergency Red Cross help.
Only two Latin American countries and one non-communist
European country received Chinese economic assistance. This
small list of recipients outside the communist bloc, Asia and
Africa was consistent with previous years. The sole new recipient
in Latin America was Jamaica. Egypt and Chile were nations
noticeably absent from China's list of aid recipients in 1978. In
the case of Egypt, China probably did not extend any aid because
it was not requested. Chinese military aid had been provided to
Egypt in 1977 after the Soviets pulled out and when Egypt needed
spare parts for MIG aircraft and other Soviet-made weapons.
During 1978 Egypt had less need for military aid and was getting
help from the oil rich Arab nations and the United States. Hence,
the absence of any mention of aid in 1978 does not indicate a
change in relations between China and Egypt. However, the fact
that China did not provide any foreign aid to Chile may be taken
to reflect a new attitude on the part of Chinese leaders toward that
nation.
Chinese leaders seem to have changed their global perspective
very little, at least as reflected in their aid giving in Latin
America, the Middle East and non-communist Europe. China's
interest in the Middle East remained considerable and its support
went to the Arabs and to countries that were anti-Soviet or where
Peking perceived that it could help stave off Soviet penetration.
Peking saw Soviet goals in the Middle East as part of continuing
Soviet efforts to surround and contain China with its naval power.
This was seen as particularly true of efforts by the Kremlin to
obtain ports for the Soviet navy. Chinese leaders perceived that if
the Soviet Union could link its European and Asian fleets, China
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would be threatened. Thus, Peking did not seem to be troubled by
the fact that most of the countries in the Middle East that it aided
were also receiving assistance from the oil-rich countries of the
region. Moreover, China seemed to perceive U.S. efforts there as
complementary to its own. In more specific terms China's aid
efforts to Sudan and North and South Yemen appeared directly
related to the Soviet presence in Ethiopia and to Moscow's efforts
at gaining a foothold in South Yemen. Elsewhere China's aid
efforts were largely symbolic.
In May a Chinese technical team arrived in the capital of the
Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) to help build a cottonginning and oil-processing plant. 16 :1 Shortly thereafter, Chinese
sources reported that a new medical team was being sent to
replace one that was leaving. 16 ~ Later in the year foreign sources
reported that China had agreed to render assistance to North
Yemen during its next five-year plan. 164 Projects mentioned
included a textile mill, an oil-processing plant, a hospital, an
agricultural project and a 90-kilometer highway. However, no
information was forthcoming on the cost of these projects or the
conditions of Chinese aid. In December a protocol agreement was
signed on the construction of an international conference hall. 1 " 5
According to this agreement, China would undertake the design
and construction and pay for the equipment and materials.
Peking's purpose in providing continued and extensive
support to North Yemen seemed to relate to its efforts to maintain
some influence in an area that Chinese leaders saw as geopolitically important. In addition, it related to Chinese hopes of
winning support in the Middle East for its global policies and for
weakening Soviet influence in the area as a whole. The situation
in North Yemen was certainly of considerable concern to other
Arab countries. Finally, aid personnel gave China a presence in
North Yemen that it would not otherwise have had. Ironically,
Chinese leaders seemed to have little interest in fostering socialist
economic development or building a communist movement in
North Yemen.
China also continued to render aid to the People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), even though that nation was
162. New China News Agency, May 10, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, June 1978,
p. 12.

163. New China News Agency, May 15, 1978, cited in Ibid.
164. Reuter, August 16, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, September 1978, p. 13.
165. New -China News Agency, December 20, 1978, cited in China Aktuell,
January 1979, p. 12.
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at odds with North Yemen and China favored the latter. In
January Chinese sources reported that a state-owned fishery
company, promised in an aid agreement with South Yemen in
1977, was under construction.1 66 In April an agreement was
signed between the two countries whereby China agreed to send
medical teams. 167 At almost the same time a group of Chinese
road construction technicians arrived to assist in the construction
of the Shihr-Sayhut Highway. 168 No details, however, were
provided on either the cost of this project or the conditions under
which Chinese aid was given. In June it was announced that
another highway was under construction that would form part of
the Aden-Mukalla Highway network. 169 This new highway link
was designed to connect the capital city of Aden with the cereal
and cotton-producing areas of the country.
Notwithstanding this rather intense aid activity there was no
mention by the Chinese media of any aid to South Yemen during
the last half of the year. Given the situation in South Yemen,
especially the growing Soviet influence there, Peking may have
perceived that its aid efforts were futile and thus wasted. This is
confirmed by an announcement in December that a Chinese
technical team which had built a tool and hardware factory in
1976, but had remained in the country to train Yemeni workers,
was departing .170
. - . ---·- --- - . --China's aid efforts in South Yemen were aimed at maintaining some presence that country, where Soviet influence had
grown, and to prevent South Yemen from falling completely into
the Soviet orbit. A further goal was to retain some influence in the
event that either a reconciliation with North Yemen or a military
victory brought about the union of the two countries. Neither of
these aims, however, seemed to hold good prospects for realization. In fact, the waning of Chinese aid activity in the latter part
of the year may have reflected the view by Chi."lese decision166. New China News Agency, January 5, 1978, cited in China Aktuell,
February 1978, p. 9. For further details on the 1977 agreement, see Copper,
"China's Foreign Aid in 1977," Current Scene, Vol. XVI, Nos. 8 and 9, p. 29.
167. New China News Agency, April16, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, May 1978,
p. 11.

168. New China News Agency, April 19, 1978, cited in ibid.
169. New China News Agency, June 22, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, July 1978,
p. 15.
170. New China News Agency, December 24, 1978, cited in China Aktuell,
January 1979, p. 12.
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makers that South Yemen had already come under Soviet
domination, or China's presence was not welcome, or both.
Sudan was the third country in the Middle East where
China's foreign aid program was active. In February the
Hassaheisa Friendship Textile Mill, built with Chinese aid, was
completed and turned over to the Sudan government. 171 According
to Chinese press comments the mill employs 1,700 workers and
produces 14 million meters of cloth annually. 172 In June a Chinese
survey team started work on another textile mill, apparently
under provisions made in a new agreement, though no negotiations were announced by either side. 173 In November an agreement was signed on the building with Chinese aid funds of a
factory to produce ready-made clothing. 174 Under the terms of this
agreement, which was apparently provisionally agreed on in
June, China pledged to provide equipment, spare parts and
training for employees of this factory, which was designed to
produce 200,000 garments yearly. It was also reported that
Chinese workers and technicians had been doing maintenance
work on a hall which they had built earlier. 175 Lastly, the Chinese
Red Cross in August donated just over $100,000 to help flood
victims in Sudan. 1 76
Elsewhere in the Middle East, Chinese sources reported that
its medical teams were working in several hospitals in Tunisia. 177
In addition, late in the year it was disclosed that equipment from
China had arrived in Tunisia for the construction of a 120kilometer canal that will provide drinking water and irrigation
water for a large citrus-fruit orchard. 178 The cost of the project,
which was negotiated in 1977, and has a I_>rojected date of
171. New China News Agency, February 28, 1978, cited in China Aktuell,
March 1978, p. 9.
i 72. New China News Agency, May 28, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, June 1978,
p. 12.
173. New China News Agency, June 7, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, July 1978,
p. 15.
174. New China News Agency, November 14, 1978, cited in China Aktuell,
December 1978, p. 13.
175. New China News Agency, August 22, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 183,
August 23, 1978, p. A14.
176. New China News Agency, August 8, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 170,
August 9, 1978, p. A4.
177. New China News Agency, April19, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, May 1978,
p. 11.
178. Radio Tunis, December 30, 1978, cited in Africa Research Bulletin,
December 15, 1978-January 14, 1979, p. 4941.
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completion set at 1983, was reported to be $17 million, of which $8
million would be contributed by China. 179 In Syria, according to
Chinese sources, a stadium was under construction using Chinese
aid funds. 1 so In Iraq the minutes of talks on the construction of a
bridge were signed, presumably as part of a Chinese aid
agreement. 181 Peking also publicized the completion of a woolen
washing and spinning mill in Iraq, built in part by Chinese aid. 182
In Kuwait a Chinese medical team was replaced by a new team,
and in Algeria Chinese medical workers were active and were
even reported to have rendered treatment to former Prime
Minister Boumedienne. 183 China also provided relief aid in the
form of blankets and canned food to help displaced persons in
southern Lebanon. 184 Finally, China provided assistance to the
Palestine Liberation Organization, in the form of medicine and
supplies delivered through its ambassador in Syria. 18 5
In Latin American and non-communist Europe, China
purveyed aid to three countries in 1978: Guyana, Jamaica and
Malta. Chile was the recipient of a sizeable aid donation in 1977
and may have drawn on these credits, although the fact that
China recently discovered a large copper field at home may have
taken away its incentive to grant economic assistance to Chile. In
the past Chinese economic aid to Chile was clearly aimed at
maintaining a guaranteed source of copper imports. 186 In any
event, there were no reports from either side on the use of Chinese
aid. Aid to Guyana consisted of continued help in building a
179. Ibid. According to the original negotiations the canal was to cost $15.7
million. The difference may be explained by more detailed estimates or changes in
values of the currencies involved. The 1978 figure is translated from Tunisian
dinars.
180. New China News Agency, February 19, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, April
1978, p. 9.
181. New China News Agency, August 28, 1978, cited in China Aktuell,
September 1978, p. 13.
182. New China News Agency, July 18, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, August
1978, p. 15.
183. New China News Agency, May 4, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, June 1978,
p. 12; New China News Agency, December 28, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 307,
December 29, 1978, p. A13.
184. New China News Agency, June 8, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 112, June
9, 1978, p. A10.
185. New China News Agency, April 14, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 74,
April 17, 1978, p. A23.
186. See Copper, "China's Foreign Aid in 1977," Current Scene, Vol. XVI, Nos.
8 and 9, p. 32 for further details on Chin's aid promises to Chile in 1977.
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textile company, a carryover of past aid work. 1 H: No new aid was
reported. China's continuing interest in Guyana, albeit small,
relates to that country's socialist government and Peking's desire
to support a left-wing government in Latin America as an
alt2rnative to Cuba. Peking's aid people also helped maintain
contacts with the government while eschewing ties with the
Guyana Communist Party, which is strong but clearly pro-Soviet.
Jamaica became a recipient of Chinese largess for the first
time in 1978. In September an agreement was signed whereby
Peking agreed to supply the equipment and materials for building
the ...Tamaican Cotton-Polyester Textile Company.i' 8 No details,
however, were provided on the value of this project or the
conditions attached to the loan or grant. In December China
signed another agreement with the Jamaican government, this
time in the form of a $1.6 million commodity loan without
interest. 1 ~' 9 China's interest in Jamaica ostensibly related to that
country's relations with other countries in the area, especially
Cuba, and to Soviet efforts to gain influence there.
Chinese economic aid to Malta, attractive for its strategic
location though of uncertain advantage to China, continued in the
form of earlier aid promises being drawn. China's official news
service in July announced that Chinese technicians were
continuing their stay in Malta, working on a large dry dock
capable of repairing 300,000-ton ships. 190 Subsequently it was
announced that China had purchased its second oil tanker from
Malta, the 5,700-ton Da Ching-217. 191 A continued presence in
Malta is apparently deemed useful by Chinese leaders in view of
China's declining presence in Albania and the apprehension that
in the near future Soviet aid personnel and military advisors may
be sent to Albania, though there was no indication in 1978 that
this might happen.

187. New China News Agency, February 2, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, March
1978, p. 9.
188. New China News Agency, September 22, 1978, cited in China Aktuell,
October 1978, p. 15.
189. New China News Agency, December 14, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No.
298, December 15, 1978, p. All.
190. New China News Agency, July 28, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, August
1978, p. 15.
191. New China News Agency, August 18, 1978, cited in FBIS, Vol. 1, No. 180,
August 19, 1978, p. A9.
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Conclusions

In some ways, China's foreign aid program in 1978 seemed to
be at a turning point. In other ways Peking's aid giving confirmed
past trends and long-standing foreign policy goals. In regard to
new directions, China seemed to be abandoning the practice of
supporting client states with large amounts of economic assistance as confirmed by its rejection of any new large project.
China's new leaders also questioned both the wisdom and the
usefulness of providing costly economic support for Vietnam and
Albania in the context of China's need for foreign exchange to
further its own development programs. Looking at the situation
another way, China would have had to make a decision to
compete with the Soviet Union in aiding Vietnam, ultimately
making Vietnam more industrialized and more prosperous than
China itself. Regarding China's aid to Albania, China's new
leadership simply perceived Albania as less useful (in the context
of China's new pragmatism) and troublesome.
Kampuchea and Pakistan may be categorized as exceptions to
China's view of supporting client states, although the latter would
hardly fit this defmition in terms of its dependence on China
economically or China's influence there. And in the case of
Kampuchea, Vietnam's defeat of the Pol Pot regime eliminated
Kampuchea as China's ally and protege in Southeast Asia. In
view of the Pol Pot regime's human rights record, China may
have been glad that he fell and may have withheld aid late in the
year, making that eventuality more probable. Clearly China's ties
with that government were an embarrassment in the context of
Peking's efforts to improve its relations with the United States.
On the other hand, China seemed to be preparing for a long fight
and appeared to be committed to supporting a guerrilla movement
against the new Vietnam-supported government in Kampuchea.
In this connection China's invasion of Vietnam early in 1979 may
be seen, at least in terms of the results expected, as costly
economically for Vietnam. China destroyed much of Vietnam's
economic infrastructure in the north as well as aid projects that
China financed and helped build. Ironically, China may be seen
as having taken away some of its aid. Vietnam is certainly
expected to experience economic problems as a result of the cutoff
of Chinese aid, the cost of rebuilding after the Chinese invasion
and, not heretofore mentioned, the loss of Chinese oil shipments.
It remains to be seen whether the Soviet Union will supplant
Chinese aid and oil. Similarly the future form of China's relations
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with Kampuchea is uncertain. Peking probably hopes to support a
new leader of the . guerrilla movement in negotiations on
Kampuchea's future leading to the exit of the Vietnam-supported
Samrin government, and the installation of a neutral government.
China will probably continue to aid Pakistan as long as it
serves as a counterweight to Indian and Soviet influence on the
subcontinent. Clearly Chinese leaders do not expect Pakistan to
become dependent upon China's aid or to institute socialism
because of its friendly ties with China and Chinese economic help.
On the other hand China's economic assistance has been helpful,
particularly in 1978 with the cutoff of U.S. aid. In addition,
China's commitment to Pakistan,fdemonstrated by its aid,
probably helped the Pakistan government maintain its hard-line
stance toward the Soviet Union and India at a time of external
pressure and internal instability.
In Africa China appears to be as committed as ever to Mrican
nations. But this now has new meaning. Peking seems less
concerned about a base of operations and permanent friends, or
allies. Rather it is looking at the region from a broader
perspective: as part of the Third World, as a large number of votes
in the U.N., and as an area where China can compete with the
Soviet Union. Clearly, at least judging from China's aid program
to African nations in 1978, Peking is no longer competing with the
West.
The Middle East remains a promising area to China:
geopolitically important and crucial to the Soviet Union and the
West due to the oil resources. This presents special opportunities, ·
though China's role in foreign aid giving has diminished in the
context of billions of dollars in oil money in the Middle East more than can be invested efficiently. Peking apparently still sees
its lies with the Muslim world as useful in checking the spread of
Soviet influence, and good relations with Middle Eastern
countries as important in terms of Peking's goals in South and
Southeast Asia and to a lesser extent Mrica. Elsewhere, namely
in Latin America, China does not seem confident enough or does
not perceive interests which justify expanding either its foreign
aid program or its foreign policy interests.
Considering all regions, China in 1978 seemed to be leaning
toward a foreign aid program with more but smaller recipients as was true of China's aid program when it was initiated in the
1950s. Peking seemed to seek more publicity for its aid program
trying to make it more a showcase to support Peking's bid for
leadership of the Third World, rather than a tool of foreign policy

44

CoNTEMPORY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

to be used to combat imperialism. On the other hand, the antiSoviet aspect of China's foreign aid diplomacy remained.
China's foreign aid program in 1978 gave additional confirmation to China's improved relations with the United States and
its efforts to become a more legitimate member of the international community. Nowhere was China's foreign aid competitive
with U.S. aid. Likewise China voiced no criticism of U.S. economic
aid. In fact, Peking seemed to structure its foreign aid giving upon
the premise that it did not want to compete with U.S. or Western
aid, and instead, where possible, it appeared to prefer allowing
U.S. aid efforts to play a leading role in impeding efforts by the
·Soviets Union to extend Soviet influence in Third World countries.
Chinese aid in this sense became complementary to Western aid,
or at least seemed to be going in this direction.
This probably also goes far in explaining China's declining
enthusiasm for supporting "wars of national liberation" and its
meager military assistance. Peking apparently now views its
relations with the U.S. and other Western countries as more
important than its erstwhile goal of supporting anti-imperialist
revolutionary movements. In this context Chinese leaders have
learned that granting military aid will evoke large Soviet grants
or sales of weapons to an opposing nation, or faction in the case of
civil wars, and that if the U.S. is unwilling to extend military aid
to stop Soviet penetration or influence, there is little China can do
that would not be counterproductive.
Similarly China's aid program in no way exhibited any
competition· with Japanese or Arab economic aid. In fact, China
seemed to be indifferent to the fact that both were giving large
amounts of aid to nations that China aided in the past and
continued to aid. This again suggests that uppermost in the minds
of Chinese leaders in terms of motivating Chinese foreign aid, was
blocking the spread of Soviet penetration of Third World countries
and Moscow's efforts to surround China with its naval power.
China's stance toward U.N. development programs and the
fact that China for the first time actively sought U.N. aid and
cooperation with U.N. programs of adevelopment nature, suggest
that China may seek U.N. help for its own development. Yet,
China still wants to be a model for Third World nations and seeks
to attain some influence with Third World countries in the
development realm through bilateral aid. It is uncertain at this
time how China will deal with this apparent contradiction.
The broadening of its foreign aid program in 1978 to include
new nations and a slightly increased number of aid projects (if
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Vietnam and Albania are not considered) suggests that China
still views its foreign aid program as a useful and an important
instrument of its foreign policy. Moreover, judging from its aid
activities in 1978, Peking still seeks to maintain a bigger presence
overseas and finds its aid people good representatives. This,
however, should be juxtaposed beside China's rather cautious
approach to foreign aid giving during the year. Chinese leaders,
especially Teng Hsiao-p'ing, seemed to be reappraising China's
foreign aid program, especially its costs, in the context of China's
needs for investment funds at home.
It should be expected that China will continue to support a
foreign aid program in the future and that foreign economic
assistance will continue
In conclusion it should be expected that China will continue to
support a fairly large foreign aid program in the future and that
foreign economic assistance will continue to play a role in the
conduct of Chinese diplomacy. Chinese aid will doubtless continue
to have a special impact in special situations and it will give
China a reputation for its support of the Third World, to offset its
small amount of trade with Third World countries. And, it will
remain a conscience of the rich nations and the Soviet Union,
since China is a poor nation with an extensive foreign aid
program. On the other hand, it remains to be seen what effect
publiciopinion in China will have on foreign aid giving. Economic
growth at home remains a top priority and it has mass support.
Thus as Chinese populace comes to realize that most of the
countries that China is giving foreign aid to are richer and are
developing as fast or faster than China, there may be some
resistance to continuing a foreign aid program. This certainly
reflects complaints in the early part of the year about China's aid
to Vietnam and Albania.
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